Fixing International Law or Fixing Castro? by Vandevelde, Kenneth J.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 48 
Issue 4 Summer 1999 Article 3 
1999 
Fixing International Law or Fixing Castro? 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Fixing International Law or Fixing Castro?, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1035 (1999). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol48/iss4/3 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
FIXING INTERNATIONAL LAW OR FIXING
CASTRO?
Kenneth J. Vandevelde*
Forty years after his rise to power, Fidel Castro continues to preoccupy
the minds of American policymakers. This is evidenced by a range of
Castro-inspired measures, from the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment t to
the 1996 Helms-Burton legislation,2 many of which have been in reaction
to Castro's uncompensated expropriation of American property.' Edwin
4D. Williamson's proposal would be the latest in this series of measures.
The use of treaties to protect property against expropriation by foreign
states dates from the early nineteenth century Such efforts have
reached unprecedented magnitude in the late twentieth century as more
than 160 states have participated in the negotiation of a network of more
than 1300 bilateral investment treaties (BITs)6 that protect foreign in-
vestment against expropriation, currency exchange controls, and dis-
criminatory treatment. Williamson proposes that this network of treaties
Dean and Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. Bachelor of Arts 1975,
University of Louisville; Juris Doctorate 1979, Harvard Law School.
1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 § 301(d)(3), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1994). The
Hickenlooper Amendment is one of several U.S. statutes requiring the imposition of vari-
ous economic sanctions on states that expropriate property owned by U.S. nationals with-
out payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Enacted in 1962, its pur-
pose was to prevent future uncompensated expropriations; thus, it did not apply to prior
Cuban expropriations. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Reassessing the Hicken-
looper Amendment, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 115 (1988).
2. U.S. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021-6091 (Supp. 1998) [hereinafter Helms-Burton].
3. See, e.g., Letter from the Department of State to Senator JW. Fulbright Con-
cerning Expropriation of U.S. Private Investments (May 7, 1962), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2078-79. In 1959, Castro initiated a series of expropriations that resulted in
the loss of nearly $1 billion in U.S. property, for which compensation has not been paid.
See id. The figure of approximately $1 billion is an estimate of the book value of the ex-
propriated property. See id.
4. See Edwin D. Williamson, U.S.-EU Understanding on Helms-Burton: A Missed
Opportunity to Fix International Law on Property Rights, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 293 (1999).
5. See, e.g., General Convention of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, Octo-
ber 3, 1824, U.S.-Colom., 8 Stat. 306. The fifth article prohibits the seizure of certain for-
eign owned property without "sufficient indemnification." Id. at 308.
6. For a listing of the treaties, see U.N. CONFERENCE OF TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S at 159-218, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. 98.II.D.8 (1998).
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be supplemented by a multilateral agreement enabling the former owner
of expropriated property to file a civil action for compensation against
any party that subsequently acquires the expropriated property or prod-
ucts produced therefrom.!
Given that the expropriation of foreign-owned property has become a
rare occurrence in the last decade,8 the recent appearance of a proposal
for a treaty directed solely at the problem of expropriation is somewhat
surprising. The explanation lies in the continuing preoccupation with
Castro. Williamson has proposed a treaty that would provide relief to
victims of Cuban expropriations similar to that afforded by Helms-
Burton,9 thereby allowing Congress to repeal that highly controversial
legislation' ° without diminishing the remedies available to American vic-
tims of the Cuban expropriations.
Williamson suggests that the treaty would serve the further purpose of
discouraging future expropriations." International law, however, recog-
nizes the legitimate power of states to expropriate foreign-owned prop-
erty, as long as they pay just compensation," a principle also recognized
in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.13 The problem thus
should be seen as one of ensuring compensation, not deterring expro-
priation.
One objection to Williamson's proposal is the conceptual difficulty in-
volved in defining the term "expropriation." At least two issues can
arise. The first is the degree of state interference needed. In other
words, at what point does state interference with property (short of a
complete confiscation) so intrude on the rights of the owner that the
property may be considered to have been expropriated?" The second
issue is how to define the property interests that are the object of the in-
terference. For example, if the right to extract minerals is property, then
7. See Williamson, supra note 4, at 304-05.
8. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 644 (1998).
9. See Williamson, supra note 4, at 293, 304, 313 (suggesting that the proposed treaty
would substitute for Helms-Burton).
10. See Ana Julia Jatar-Hausmann, What Russia Can Learn from Cuba / What Cuba
Can Teach Russia, 113 FOREIGN POLICY 87, 89 (1998-99). Helms-Burton is extremely
unpopular with America's allies, who resent American attempts to coerce other countries
to support American economic sanctions against Cuba. See id.
11. See Williamson, supra note 4, at 304.
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 712 (1987).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (classic U.S. constitu-
tional case recognizing this problem).
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legislation that prohibits mining, and thus extinguishes that property
right, could be an expropriation. If the property right is defined more
broadly as the owner's entire interest in the land, then the same prohibi-
tion on mining could be said to leave the property largely intact and thus
not to constitute an expropriation. 5
Property protection treaties historically have not defined the term
"expropriation." This is attributable perhaps to the fact that the expro-
priations usually contemplated by those treaties were state seizures by
force or decree of large commercial enterprises -situations in which few
would contest that an expropriation had occurred." The Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiations described by Williamson,
however, involved the developed states of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which have highly
regulated economies and whose investors own a broad array of invest-
ments in the territories of the other negotiating parties. In the course of
the negotiations, it became apparent that a wide range of ordinary regu-
latory activity could extinguish specific rights and, if each of these rights
were protected by the treaty, then much of this regulatory activity could
constitute compensable expropriations. As Williamson reports, the vex-
ing problem of how to define expropriation was among the issues that led
to the failure of the MAI negotiations. 7
Williamson suggests that the United States might avoid these problems
in his proposed treaty with a reservation that defines the term "expro-
priation" coextensively with the term "taking" in the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. 8 Defining international legal obligations in
terms of a party's domestic law, however, is always a troubling practice
because the party can change its domestic law, thereby unilaterally modi-
fying its treaty obligations. Those who care about creating an interna-
tional human rights law (as Williamson does) should be slow to suggest a
solution that binds states to no greater obligations than those required by
one state's domestic laws. Such a reservation by the United States could
prompt other states to define expropriation in problematic ways. Fur-
15. See Williamson, supra note 4, at 308-09 (addressing this concern surrounding the
definition of "expropriation").
16. See generally G. C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under Inter-
national Law?, 1962 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307 (1962) (discussing state seizures of alien en-
terprises and the definition of expropriation); Burns H. Weston, "Constructive Takings"
Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping Expropriation,"
16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1975) (analyzing the confusion associated with defining expropria-
tion).
17. See Williamson, supra note 4, at 297-99, 308.
18. See id. at 309.
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thermore, how the proposed registry of expropriated property would op-
erate is unclear if states are not using a common definition of expropria-
tion. A better approach than a U.S. reservation may be to address the
problem directly in the text of the proposed treaty with careful defini-
tions of the terms "expropriation" and "property." As the MAI negotia-
tions demonstrated, however, this would be no easy task.
Another objection to Williamson's proposal is that the treaty could re-
sult in compensation of the expropriated owner in an amount unrelated
to the value of the loss. Under the proposed treaty, for example, the
former owner of an expropriated automobile manufacturing plant would
have a claim for compensation against the new plant owner and anyone
who acquired an automobile manufactured in the plant.'9 The perpetual
recovery of compensation could result in compensation in excess of the
value of the expropriated plant (particularly if the plant was operating at
a loss or heavily laden with debt). More to the point, there simply would
be no relationship between the owner's loss and the total compensation
eventually received. Given that the purpose of the treaty should not be
to deter expropriation, but to ensure just compensation, the proposed
treaty should permit recovery of only the value of the expropriated
property.
Although international law in the past has protected solely foreign
owners of property against expropriation, Williamson's proposed treaty
would provide domestic owners of expropriated property an interna-
tional venue in which to assert claims for compensation, drawing an
analogy to human rights treaties that protect individuals from their own
governments. 20 This is a laudable proposal, not only because it would
create symmetry between international treatment of economic and non-
economic rights, but also because it would build a domestic constituency
in support of liberalism, generally. The proposal would make clear that
liberalism is defensible as a matter of principle and not merely as a Tro-
jan horse for the economic interests of developed states.2'
This brings us to what may be the single greatest problem with Wil-
liamson's proposal - its acceptability to other states. To some, the treaty
will seem to be less a logical evolution in international human rights law
than an attempt to enlist the international community in what many re-
19. See id. at 305.
20. See id. at 306.
21. My praise of this proposal is not disinterested. I advanced a similar proposal in
two essays published last year. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the
International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373 (1998); Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621 (1998).
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gard as an increasingly tiresome American grudge against Castro. The
most sympathetic audience for the proposal would be the other OECD
countries but, as Williamson notes, the Understanding that the OECD
states were considering as part of the MAI negotiations (and which failed
along with the MAI negotiations) was weaker than his proposal.22
The problem of the uncompensated Cuban expropriations justifiably
remains on the American agenda, and attempts to find alternatives to the
Helms-Burton legislation are deserving of praise. It increasingly ap-
pears, however, that a workable solution to the Cuban expropriations
awaits the rejuvenation of the Cuban economy and the restoration of
normal relations between the United States and Cuba.23
22. See Williamson, supra note 4, at 296-304 (explaining the provisions and the weak-
nesses of the Understanding).
23. See generally RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS (1975); Richard B. Lillich &
Burns H. Weston, Lump Sum Agreements: Their Continuing Contribution to the Law of
International Claims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1988). Massive expropriations of foreign
property under the banner of socialist reform often have taken decades to resolve and fre-
quently have been settled by the expropriating state making lump sum payments to the
home states of the victims. See generally LILLICH & WESTON, supra; Lillich & Weston,
supra.
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